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This article explores a particular gendered manifestation of anti-migration politics and activism following 
the rise in numbers of asylum seekers entering the EU by focusing on a Finnish right-wing street 
patrolling organization called the Soldiers of Odin (SOO), founded in October 2015. The group has been 
organizing street patrols meant to protect Finnish women from different forms of public gender-based 
violence by migrants. The appearance of SOO reflects the way debates around migration to Finland have 
been increasingly polarized with “advocates of tolerance” and “immigration critics” clashing in TV 
shows and Internet forums, but also in the streets through demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. 
Based on a discursive analysis of publically available sources written by and about the SOO in 
Finland, we offer a gendered reading of anti-immigrant sentiments and reactions. We argue that these 
were not just triggered by an ongoing fear of loss of economic privileges under neoliberal and austerity 
politics (Mäkinen, 2016), but also by anxieties from the diminishing status of white heterosexual 
masculinities. Concurrently, we identify four recurring themes that appear in the SOO’s self-presentation 
which are used by members to portray themselves as part of a legitimate social movement: protective 
masculinity, militarized masculinity, supplement of the state, and indigenous masculinity. One concept 
that is of particular relevance for explaining the overall logic of these different themes is that of “white 
border guard masculinities”, developed by Suvi Keskinen. White border-guards are characterized by “a 
fixation on borders, border-control, cultural boundary work and exclusions that are treated as necessities 
in the changing setting” (2013: 227).  
By focusing on the practice of street patrolling which is organized as a response to sexual 
harassment, we seek to add another perspective to the growing literature in feminist security studies on 
everyday peace and urban conflict in contemporary Europe (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel, 2016). We 
find that street patrolling is a practice of vigilantism that is justified by using representations of the 
cityspace as a place of friction between locals and newcomers; and of the street as a locus for projecting 
and enacting gendered and racial/ethnic identities. As such, we develop the concept of gendered 
vigilantism by exploring the way practices and discourses about sexual harassment, particularly street 
harassment, reinscribe geographical boundaries between Europeans and asylum seekers. We conclude 
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that understanding the formation of street patrols as a performative act of white militarized masculinity 
is highly important for understanding current patterns of mobilization among national-populist 
supporters and thus, deserves more critical attention.  
 
Securitizing public gender-based violence  
Feminist engagements with practices of public harassment of women by ‘strange’ men have been 
systematically developing for several decades. Street harassment was defined by Micaela di Leonardo 
(1981) as an interaction that occurs when strange men accost women whom they perceive as heterosexual 
in a public place. “Through looks, words, or gestures the man asserts his right to intrude on the woman’s 
attention, defining her as a sexual object, and forcing her to interact with him” (p. 51-2). This scholarship 
shows that in certain contexts, harassment by strangers is more prevalent than non-stranger sexual 
harassment (MacMillan et al., 2000) and identifies the prevalent types of interactions between 
unacquainted men and women to include staring, whistling, groping, flashing, stalking and various types 
of sexist or homophobic slurs. It has yielded important insights into the ways harassment objectifies 
women and limits their ability to be in public spaces such as streets, markets and public transportation 
(Bowman, 1993) by increasing women’s fear of rape and limiting their movement (Fairchild and 
Rudman, 2008). Nonetheless, policy discourses about women’s public safety have been incomplete, 
particularly because it is hard to arrest, prosecute and even prove that such incidents occur. Also, the 
tensions between the articulation of lived experience of sexual harassment and “the boundaries necessary 
for legal and policy interventions” may encourage different discourses and connotations of such incidents 
(Vera Gray, 2016). 
Within feminist security studies, which aim to broaden the concept of security and include 
gendered experiences and standpoints (Tickner, 1992), there has been little interest in the different 
approaches to what constitutes public harassment, how to name it, and what is the harm it entails to 
women as individuals and as a group. Compared with other forms of violence against women, including 
honor killings (Hansen, 2000) or wartime rape (Baaz and Stern, 2009), public manifestations of 
‘everyday’ gender-based violence are seen as a domestic issue, linked with crime or welfare, which fall 
out of the core interest of security studies and global politics. However, cross-national evidence reveals 
that various countries have recently instituted policies to minimize street harassment as a response to 
security threats. For example, during the Arab Spring, sexual harassment of women protesters in Cairo 
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was narrated through two different sets of spatial representations of Tahrir square— either as a liberating 
space where women can experiment new forms of public bodily presence, or as a violent and repressive 
place dominated by hyper-masculinized Arab men. Sexual harassment politics in this case served as a 
“crucial laboratory for testing and reformulating the mix of emancipatory and repressive governance 
practices that constitute contemporary gender-sensitive ‘human security’ regimes” (Amar, 2011: 299). 
Situated within the feminist literature on security, our case study continues to investigate 
contemporary ways in which masculinity and militarization are co-constituent in civilian contexts 
through everyday praxis and popular media (Enloe, 2016). Our focus on the process of securitization of 
sexual harassment in Europe was guided by three theoretical assumptions. First, that spatial practices of 
everyday violence, which are generally invisible and trivialized, can transform by means of 
representation into dramatic signifiers of social conflict over urban space. Second, that the political 
vocabulary of intersectional analysis is useful for expanding research on street harassment and the 
debates associated with it. Moving beyond the common articulation of masculine versus feminine 
subjects to portray the indivisibility of race and gender, recent cases imply that certain feminized bodies 
are more vulnerable than others in the public sphere (e.g. black or lesbian bodies) and that these 
vulnerabilities are represented unequally (Fogg-Davis, 2006). Finally, we join the feminist critique of the 
Copenhagen School’s top-down definition of securitization as a process that involves formal security 
agents (states, militaries, international organizations) by exploring how communities and individuals take 
part in expanding the meaning of security (Hudson, 2009). When public harassment is securitized, it is 
often perceived as an existential threat not only for women, but also to the broader collective. In 
nationalist contexts such occurrences may be linked with a perception of women’s bodies as biological 
carriers and signifiers of the collective. Consequently, the emergence of fraternal organizations, which 
aim to prevent gender-based violence, create an everyday feminist security dilemma in which women’s 
voices may be silenced (Hansen, 2000). Given this silence, it is difficult to assess the actual threat to 
women’s safety. Hence, this dilemma redirected our attention to the power of ordinary speech acts and 
emotions: to the possibility of voicing, acting and identifying a threat as existential/real in order to justify 
severe popular action; and to the way social anxieties and emotions (fear, anger, hostility) are expressed 
in this context (Åhäll and Gregory, 2013). Consequently, this study takes a narrative approach to security 
(Wibben, 2010) that does not seek to determine whether or not immigrant men are actually threatening 
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women’s wellbeing, but to better understand how fraternal organizations frame public forms of gender-
based harassment as an excuse for action.  
 What is gendered vigilantism? We use this concept to describe contemporary organized street 
patrols in Europe that are meant to protect local women from sexual harassment or other forms of public 
gendered-based violence by migrants. Gendered vigilantism, as a practice, attempts to re-inscribe 
geographical boundaries between Europeans and asylum seekers and involves small groups of white 
civilian men that patrol in the vicinity of refugee shelters or mixed neighborhoods. Based on a perception 
of the cityspace/street as a place of friction or conflict, such patrols may be linked in various ways with 
the rise of populism and involve performative aspects of protective and militarized masculinity that are 
reproduced in media coverage and public representations. In this perspective, we understand gendered 
vigilantism as a set of performances that are both producing and the product of a variety of femininities 
and masculinities. These are micro-political moves that rely and produce affect and emotions, which are 
an essential part of constructing public spaces as safe or dangerous (Solomon and Steele, 2017). Thus, 
we seek to examine the embodiment of these emotions in different types of masculinities that are 
produced through representations and practices of patrolling, and to highlight how these gender roles and 
models are not only interconnected with each other, but also related to other representations relating for 
instance to immigrant masculinities and sexualities, and to supposedly threatened Finnish femininities. 
 In order to understand the way discourses about public gender based violence operate as markers 
of contemporary urban conflicts in Europe and as sites of reproduction, creation and performance of 
masculinity, we use Lefebvre’s (1991) distinction between spatial practice which include active forms 
of ‘doing’ as well as ‘things that happen’ in everyday spaces; and representational space which is the 
way space is conceptualized through media representations, narratives and counter-narratives. Spatial 
practices that are relevant to this study include organized actions occurring in public urban settings that 
we identify as “the street”: civilian patrolling and state policing as well as random occurrences of street 
harassment and more brutal forms of sexual violence. The representational dimensions of space include 
verbal texts (media reports, social media interactions, interviews etc.) and non-verbal images 
(photographs, symbols, film) that relate directly to “the street” as a public space. 
Based on the above, our research question is: how are discourses concerning public gender based 
violence related to migration and used to justify the establishment of fraternal organizations and the 
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Our choice to rely only on representations in publically available sources and not to incorporate other 
types of data about SOO members, local residents and policy makers was informed by the following 
reasons. First, ethnographic research or in-depth interviews can indeed capture the way anti-immigrant 
sentiments are formed at the individual or community level, yet direct access to activities and internal 
documents of far-right groups like the SOO is difficult and could even be dangerous. “Far-right groups 
tend to regard academics as untrustworthy or hostile and generally are determined to prevent entree to 
their groups or members” (Blee, 2007: 121).1  
Second, since some authors understand populism more as a specific political style rather than a 
coherent political ideology (e.g. Mudde, 1996) it is important to use external data to better understand 
how these groups present themselves to the public, regardless of their internal structures of organization, 
recruitment and decision-making procedures. Rydgren (2007) argues that populist groups “present 
themselves as the real champions of true democracy—as a new kind of party—which takes the worries 
and interests of the common man into account” (p. 246). Consequently, verbal statements, interviews, 
websites and videos that relate to issues of safety in the street (as an actual place) may represent an 
attempt to actively engage in a public process of “recoding the political space” (Rydgren, 2007). Third, 
due to the general inconsistent trends of reporting on various forms of sexual violence which are 
constantly lower than actual assaults (Mellgren, Andersson & Ivert, 2017), we were aware of the 
complexity of obtaining an ‘objective’ perspective on contemporary patterns of street harassment in 
Finland after 2015. In order to avoid an oversimplification of the debate over immigration and gender-
based violence, we chose to adopt an interpretive approach rather than a causal one, e.g. we focus on the 
way the connection between immigration and sexual violence is discursively framed by SOO members 
and others, without addressing the empirical question of whether or not there was any change in numbers 
or patterns of reported cases of sexual violence.  
Nonetheless, in order to clarify this point further we would like to mention some relevant data 
from other sources. First, a 1999 study of street harassment in two districts in Helsinki, the largest city 
in Finland, found that harassment was quite common and that 69%-59% of the women surveyed reported 
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they experienced offensive remarks, staring and exhibitionism in public places during the previous year 
(Koskela and Tani, 2005). Given that according to a recent EU survey conducted by the European Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2014) approximately every fifth woman over the age of 15 has reported 
that she was sexually harassed, it is possible to assume that in a given year between 20%-60% of Finnish 
women experience some form of street harassment. Second, police data published in 2017 by the Official 
Statistics of Finland (OSF), shows that although there has been a slight decrease in overall sexual 
offenses, there was a steady increase in the numbers of reported rape cases from 748 in 2013 to 945 in 
2017, a 26.3% increase. 
 
Table 1: Reported offences (sexual crimes) in Finland: January to September 2013-2017  
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sexual abuse of a 
child 1,301 1,090 897 944 888 
Rape 748 760 767 854 945 
sexual crimes total 
2,606 2,258 2,237 2,519 2,427 
Source: Official Statistics Finland, 2017 
 
This pattern has not been linked officially to immigration. Rather, the Finnish police maintains 
that the increase in reported rape cases is a direct result of growing public awareness to sexual violence 
as well as an indirect outcome of improvements in local victims support services and legal rights (Police 
Press Release, 2017). However, as we show later on, the idea that immigrants and asylum seekers are 
responsible for the rise in reported cases of sexual crimes appeared as a dominant framing in local media 
outlets, usually by interviewing anti-immigrant groups or ordinary residents who are concerned for their 
safety.  
Our analysis of these perceptions was based on four types of publically available materials on the 
Soldiers of Odin, which were published from late 2015 until early 2018. First, we collected written texts 
and visuals produced by members of SOO which included: the organization’s website, which has 
undergone several changes during the period of research; 28 YouTube videos produced by members and 
approximately 2,000 posts that appeared on 37 Facebook pages from various local branches of the SOO 
in Finland, and another 67 Facebook pages from SOO groups around the world. Second, we looked at 
media reports published in daily newspapers and television in Finland and found 102 written articles and 
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23 YouTube videos relating to SOO’s practice of street patrolling and references to refugees, sexual 
violence and street harassment. Third, in international media coverage we found 25 written texts and 17 
YouTube videos concerning the aforementioned topics. Finally, we incorporated data from the website 
of Loldiers of Odin, a group of activists that appeared in Tampere, Finland in early 2016 as a reaction to 
SOO and incorporated 5 Facebook pages (300 posts) relating to their activities. All sources were analysed 
according to their relevance to the research subject by searching for various references and combinations 
of “immigrants/asylum seekers/refugees” and “street patrol”, “sexual harassment”, “women” and “girls”. 
All relevant quotes were translated back and forth by a native Finnish speaker to avoid 
misunderstandings. 
Because we found a clear similarity (in substance and style) between self-written materials and 
external quotations in newspaper interviews and documentaries, the majority of quotes we use in this 
article are taken from the SOO website, members’ official Facebook posts and videos. The following 
quote exemplifies how the group seeks to actively use internet platforms to self-justify its ideology and 
practices as a legitimate social movement vis-à-vis a generally hostile media: 
 
We Soldiers of Odin Members are beginning to tire of media lies and blackmail. […] Soldiers 
of Odin is not: 
- A racist group 
- A national socialist movement 
- A drug dealing group 
- A motorcycle club 
- A criminal organization (Support Soldiers of Odin Ry Rovaniemi, 2017). 
 
Our approach to these texts was informed by the assumption that Facebook is a popular network 
among different demographics, is integrated into the lives of individuals and social groups, and could be 
seen as “an ongoing database of social activity with information being added in real time” (Wilson et al., 
2012: 204). Although social media is interactive and to a certain degree, dialogical, we did not conduct 
a network study or an online conversation analysis. Rather, we subscribe to a broader discursive method, 
aimed at decoding language, themes and meaning to better understand the proclaimed image of SOO as 
it was represented in various postings by members of the community when referring to sexual violence, 
street harassment and street patrols. Broadly, this type of analysis falls into the category of identity 
presentation, e.g. the investigation of how social movements present themselves on social media. In the 
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following sections we present the analysis and argue that the SOO perform masculinity in four different 
yet complementary ways: as protectors, as soldiers, as good citizens and as indigenous white-men. 
  
Soldiers of Odin: Protectors of the public space  
The SOO were founded in the northern Finnish town of Kemi in October 2015. Initially described as a 
“patriotic organization fighting for a white Finland” (former SOO website, now closed), the new website 
describes the objectives of the organization as follows:  
We are a patriotic street patrol association, who are against harmful immigration, islamisation, 
EU and globalization. We also strive to reject these mentioned problems caused side effects, like 
reduced safety situation (English version, new SOO website).  
In February 2016, the first group in Kemi became a registered association with the official aim to develop 
a “culture of security”. By July 2018, three additional local groups were officially registered in Pori 
(2016), Hyvinkää (2017) and Turku (2018).2 The group’s Finnish Facebook page counted more than 
48,000 likes, and the group claims a membership of 600 in Finland, though actual figures are likely to be 
lower. The group asserts that it has active local sections in Kemi, Joensuu, Pietarsaari, Tampere, Helsinki, 
Asikkala and in around twenty other locations throughout Finland. The group has also established itself 
in a series of other countries like Norway, Sweden, Iceland, the UK, the US, Canada, Estonia and 
Germany. We identify the SOO as a national-populist group because of its use of polarized oppositions 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to develop a political notion of ‘the ordinary and forgotten people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt and paralyzed elites (Brubaker, 2017). Concurrently, this study focuses on what is known in 
social movement theory as the emergence phase in which the structure, agenda and activities of such 
movements are still flux and negotiable.  
 SOO started organizing in response to the arrival of around 32,000 asylum seekers in 2015 in 
Finland, which demonstrated a dramatic increase compared to 2014 (3,600). Even though Finland still 
has a relatively small migrant community compared to other European countries (6% of population as 
compared to an average of 10% in the European Union) this wave of migration generated various public 
debates and controversies related in particular to the assumed responsibility of migrants in sexual 
assaults and street harassment. According to an official statement by the SOO in early 2018 they 
officially oppose immigration and see it as a source of various social evils:  
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We are, without a doubt, against illegal immigration, and we strongly oppose it (…). Rapes, 
thefts, harassment, vandalism, diseases, millions of euros, social welfare spent on these 
uninvited guests (Soldiers of Odin, 2018). 
The main form of activism taken by the group has been that of street patrols meant to protect Finnish 
women from sexual harassment by migrants. The following citation explains the logic behind street 
patrolling as a responsible act of citizenry and stresses the members’ sense of respectability and strict 
criteria for entering the group:  
Soldiers of Odin is a peaceful organization whose main task is to safeguard the lives and health of 
private people. We are not a racist, political or violent group, but an organization seeking peace 
and security on the streets. We are not taking a position on politics or on the political or religious 
views of our members. We are united in our desire to keep our homeland safe for everyone (Soldiers 
of Odin Mikkeli, 2016). 
 
Compiling systematic statistics on SOO’s membership was complicated because the group keeps 
such information secret. However, a review of data publicly available on their members, including 
pictures and videos of their patrolling activities, reveals that the clear majority of them are white, working 
class men and relatively few active women. One British journalist (Simons, 2016) who had access to 
their Kemi headquarters for instance met a dustman, several steel workers, a mechanic, a truck driver 
and a factory worker, all of whom patrolled regularly with the group. These reports echo previous 
research that has shown how appeals to defend the Finnish nation focused on “the ‘regular guy’ and 
working-class masculinities” (Keskinen, 2011: 119). For example, the use of the word “club” (kerho in 
Finnish) to describe the local SOO structures indicates a search for respectability that was often absent 
from neo-Nazi networks and skinheads gangs (Cotter, 1999).  
Previous studies of the media’s role in the rise of populism in Finland found that immigration 
became a central topic of debate around the increase of political power of The Finns Party 
(Perussuomalaiset) prior to the 2011 elections. According to Horsti and Nikunen (2013), the anti-
immigration movement focused on the failure of multiculturalism and criticized the “media and 
politicians for de-emphasising the problems and ‘true’ costs of immigration”. In the 2015 crisis, many 
discussions were centered on the assumed migrants’ religion, and in particular on the incompatibility 
between Islam and Finnish culture (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2016). In January 2016, these debates became 
particularly fierce after the publication of reports of harassment of women by migrants at New Year 
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celebrations in Helsinki which echoed similar events in Köln and other German cities.3 In early 2016, 
Mika Ranta, the original founder of SOO, explained that what triggered the formation of SOO was that 
they “learned” about asylum seekers peeping at schoolgirls:  
The biggest issue was when we learned from Facebook that new asylum seekers were hanging 
around primary schools, taking pictures of young girls (Taponen, 2015).  
Rumors about asylum seekers harassing young girls, or “black men” going out with underage Finnish 
girls, have fueled fears of sexual violence and harassment. The political power of these representations 
is reinforced by a public display of emotional responses to sexual violence as abhorrent and dramatic 
events (Åhäll and Gregory, 2013). In the newspaper reports we scanned, emotional expressions of fear 
and anxiety appeared mostly in anecdotal quotes of ordinary women (“I am afraid of letting my kids come 
here alone”). In contrast, members of the SOO proudly describe acts of bravery where they supposedly 
thwarted attempts by migrants to sexually abuse very young girls, and although it is possible that these 
stories were made up, they reflect a discursive tendency to portray Finnish men as a source of protection. 
For example, in March 2016, SOO pretended to stop an attempted sexual harassment of two underage 
girls by two refugees, an act for which, they said, the police had thanked them. It later emerged that the 
story was entirely fabricated, and the group apologized and promised to expel the member responsible 
for the false information (Koski, 2016). 
In line with the above anecdote, the group’s public discourse is meant to present a bold, daring, 
responsible, patriotic and protectionist agenda which could be interpreted as a manifestation of protective 
masculinity (Young, 2003). Group members publically denounce overtly racist and xenophobic ideas as 
popular misunderstandings and portray themselves as ‘regular guys’ (working, married, responsible) who 
are screened in advance to avoid trouble. This Facebook post by the SOO’s local section in Oulu 
demonstrates how the term ordinary Finn is used to legitimize the group as a social movement:  
Oulu’s soldiers of Odin are looking for new members to secure the streets of Oulu. If you want to 
make your contribution to a safer environment, join us. The Soldiers of Odin are ordinary Finnish 
citizens, who share a concern for their homeland security. Members have to be more than 18 years 
old, be responsible and aware of all the risks involved. Trust and loyalty to other members must be 
unwavering (Support Soldiers of Odin Oulu, 2017).  
 However, some of the media reports we found suggest that Nazi references, images and symbols 
make up a large part of the SOO culture (Rigatelli, 2016a). They cite racist jokes and comments as 
commonplace among members in private and closed discussion forums and refer to the fact that the group 
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has established links with MV Lehti, a well-known extreme-right information website. A video shot by 
The Daily Mail shows that a SS officer’s hat, a Nazi-era dagger and other white supremacist material 
were on display in the SOO headquarters in the town of Kemi (Simons, 2016). Some of the SOO 
interviewed admit that racism is present within their ranks, but dismiss it as being limited to individual 
cases such as their leader’s Mika Ranta (Simons, 2016). Instead they stress that the group’s rules take 
preference over personal opinions. Similarly, many admit their rejection of immigration and of Islam, 
but reject the accusation of racism:  
What is racist? If you want to protect your family and friends you are racist? You want to protect 
your homeland from invaders you are racist? You don’t accept mass-immigration and Islam you 
are racist? The word ‘racist’ has lost its meaning a looooong time ago. Everything is racist 
nowadays (Soldiers of Odin Mikkeli, 2017).  
 
Militarized masculinity: Anti-immigrant street patrols 
The use of the term Soldier allures to the process of militarization which has been identified with the 
surge in popularity of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Liedekerke 
(2016), despite considerable variations, these groups share militarized characteristics that include 
training, distinct attire/uniform, some access to arms; and promote populist, hyper-nationalist, 
xenophobic, anti-western and anti-democratic ideas and values. Indeed, unwavering loyalty and trust 
between members are among the values often quoted as central for the SOO (Ahjopalo, 2016), as well 
as secrecy. Members are divided – and get different insignia – according to their rank and seniority, thus 
mimicking secret armies and secret societies. Those who want to join have to go through an initiation 
period during which their reliability is tested, before they can be accepted as full members of the group. 
 Patrolling, like vigilantism in general, is a militarized practice. It involves private citizens that 
engage voluntarily in planned activities that aim to control crime by offering assurance of security to a 
certain part of the population. Many vigilante groups exhibit a “form of autonomous citizenship” that is 
similar to social movements, but they often rise as a response to a threat on social order and include the 
use of force or threats to use force (Johnston, 1996). By stressing the threat of harassment of Finnish 
women and girls by migrants, SOO clearly position migration as a gender issue, indirectly implying that 
security threats for women are existential threats to the nation as a collective ethnos (Partio, 2016). 
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The linkage of gender, migrants and insecurity reflects a combination of broader processes of 
“securitization of immigration” which occurred in the context of EU integration, and local experiences 
with previous waves of migration. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign street 
prostitutes were represented as a threat to Finnish women’s security. This stereotype positioned the street 
as a space of resistance and helped create a defensive sense of community when female residents founded 
a movement called “Prostitution off the Streets” (Tani, 2002). Keskinen (2011) in her analysis of the 
‘gang rape cases in Oulu’, argues that in 2006-7 a series of unsolved sexual assaults were debated around 
the ‘threat’ posed by migration. She considers these events to be a significant moment in the development 
of the public debate in Finland on immigration and multiculturalism. Concurrently, in 2015, when other 
cases of sexual violence were assumed or proven to have been perpetrated by migrants, public opinion 
was already polarized on the issue. The incidents were heavily covered by the media, and used by anti-
immigrant groups as a vindication of their racist ideologies. It is at this period, we argue, that SOO start 
to mobilize and recruit followers through gendered vigilantism. The different tropes of masculinity 
presented by the group represent a broader shift from representational space, e.g. discursive 
representations of migrants as street harassers—to a spatial practice of public street patrolling. 
The SOO was not the only group to initiate patrols at the time. Smaller groups, like the Street 
Hawks or the Kosken Sissit4, sometimes constituted of “concerned parents” and older anti-immigrant 
groups, such as the Finnish Defense League (Vastarintaliike) founded in 2011, have also been organizing 
vigilante missions, though these have arguably maintained a much lower profile than the SOO. Since the 
practice of patrolling is not new in Finland and could be traced as far as the Finnish Civil War period 
(1918) (Tepora and Roselius, 2014) and to the right-wing Lapua Movement (Lapuanliike) of the 1930s 
(Kestilä, 2006), we assume that the practice itself is not only an instrumental act of militant organization, 
but also a performance of national/ethnic tropes. Anti-immigrant patrols had also been established in 
Finland during the 1990s, but they were not organized nationally and were of a smaller scale than those 
of the past few years. The emergence of groups such as the SOO has thus to be read through the prism 
of these previous experiences. 
 
A supplement of the state?  
Do you remember the statements on our group and on the futility of street patrols? We have 
been walking around in the key places around Finland for the protection of people, and there 
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is a need for even more street patrols. The decision-makers have decided to destroy the 
security of this country. We will not be able to restore the safety that existed in Finland before 
multiculturalism, but we can guarantee safety in places where we are patrolling. We’re 
going to organize more street patrols (Support Soldiers of Odin Ry Tampere, 2017b).  
  
The state’s response to the emergence of street patrols was slow and vague. Some significant public 
figures such as Mikko Paatero (Vanninen, 2016), the ex-chief of police services, or Jari Lindström 
(Rydman, 2016), the Minister of Justice and Labour, even came out in support of civilian vigilantism. 
Other major Finnish authorities, and in particular the Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, clearly stated (Ahtokivi, 
2016) that private citizens cannot assume the role of the police that is responsible for the maintenance of 
law and order. It seems that the position of the police authorities in Finland at this stage was to allow 
street patrols to organize as a disciplinary mechanism, e.g. to tolerate them as long as they report 
incidents they witness to the police and do not try to intervene directly (Myllyniemi, 2016). Exhibiting 
pride and respect towards state security institutions (military and police), some SOO members referred 
to their activities as a legitimate extension of state security, while stating that they do not want to replace 
them. The heavy use of action verbs in the following statement also reveals how the group’s identity 
during its emergence phase was based on “doing security” as a form of responsible citizenship:  
We walk on the streets, help if someone is in distress (and wants help) and act as the eyes of the 
authority in potentially violent situations. Does that make us people who want to play at being the 
police? I do not really want to be a police officer (Soldiers of Odin Turku, 2017).  
 
Nonetheless, the SOO are critical towards political elites and the government. The idea that the Finnish 
government has “screwed everything up” in the context of a rise of migrant-related crime seems to be 
widespread among SOO’s ranks: “The Government screwed things up so bad, and we are the 
consequence” (Simons, 2016). References to responsible citizenship, to heteronormative and protective 
masculinity are thus used to justify their status as legitimate law enforcers:  
As [men] married with families [perheellisinä] we realized that the situation must be addressed 
before it is too late. Our goal is to create a higher threshold for criminal acts and sexual assault 
regardless of ethnic background (MTV Uutiset, 2015). 
 
Indigenous masculinity versus ‘imperialistic Islam’  
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Seen within the historical context of the Finnish far-right, the case of the SOO offers an interesting take 
on secular-religious tensions in Europe. Its name, referring to the Norse god Odin, inscribes the group in 
the tradition of Odinism, which re-emerged in the United States, Europe and elsewhere in the 1960s as a 
form of “racial paganism” (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002: 257). Odinism builds on Nordic mythology in order 
to establish the superiority of white races (see also Gardell, 2003), and in the Nordic context it marks a 
romanticized, indigenous form of identity which seeks to reclaim an imagined European past. The attire 
and symbols that appear in SOO public photos and Facebook pages include an assemblage of references 
to the Viking and Crusade eras: horned helmets, shields, axes, ornaments, beards, long hair, red crosses 
etc. This mostly pagan imagery and discourse complement the defensive territorial presence of the SOO, 
promoting a specific and “authentic” ideology of Nordic indigeneity which is seen as is secular, white, 
strong and masculine. This understanding of a culture under attack (or, masculinity under attack) offers 
a paradox since in postcolonial contexts the term “indigenous” is often juxtaposed with Western culture 
and its imperial legacies (Fisk 2017). 
Similar to other national populist movements in Europe (Vieten, 2016; Brubaker, 2017), one of 
the most recurrent ideas in SOO discourses is that Islam is incompatible with Finnish culture, therefore 
making the integration of migrants (who are automatically assumed to be Muslims) impossible. The 
arrival of culturally different people who are racialized others is seen as a threat: “No Muslims with a 
significant minority status anywhere in the world have merged in any way with the majority population 
and where they are as a majority, Sharia law is applied” (SOO Website, 22 January 2018). The migrants’ 
assumed religion turns them into aliens, and means that they can never be integrated:  
A religion that denies all kinds of things like independent thinking, that gives no value to higher 
education and that justifies the killing of people with disabilities cannot be merged into a 
democratic and secular European Community (SOO Website, 22 January 2018).  
In line with what other radical right wing movements have been saying elsewhere, SOO see Islam as a 
collective threat and portray it as an uncivilized and “terrorist religion”. Keeping with European 
scientific-racist legacies, these ideas are framed as rational conclusions and not as emotional responses: 
“It is possible to think that civilizations can blend in, but the idea of a merger between civilization and 
the barbarians can be rationally rejected” (SOO Website, 22 January 2018).  
In these narratives migrants are portrayed as “intruders” whose arrival destabilizes Finland’s 
peaceful existence. The use of militaristic language and explicit references to the term ‘war’ reinforces a 
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spatial perception of the cityspace and the street in particular as dangerous zones: “Some sort of civil war 
is taking place in a number of countries of the world due to Islam” (SOO Website, 22 January 2018). But 
if migrants are a threat, it is also because their (assumed) religion is supposedly threatening to overcome 
Christianity and “western” culture:  
Islam is a strongly spreading totalitarian ideology which rejects democracy, human rights and equality 
between man and woman. It is a fascist ideology, which proclamation and following must be banned 
in Finland and all western countries (SOO Website, general description provided in English).  
The “Great Replacement” theory, notably defended by French radical right wing writers such as Renaud 
Camus (2011), who claims that European populations are gradually being replaced by non-European and 
Muslim populations, finds echoes in many SOO discourses:  
In the videos seen on the web, Muslim martyrs urge every believer to take four wives and to do twenty 
children. This would also guarantee the majority to Muslims in a fairly short period of time (SOO 
Website, 18 January 2018).  
This leads to a gendered-culturalism that is based on the often-repeated idea that cultural/ethnic war 
might be inevitable: “Islam will not know peace until all recognize the true god of Allah and his Prophet 
Muhammad. Jihad, Holy War is the most important message of Islam” (SOO Website, 16 January 2018). 
Gendered culturalism assumes that Islam carries a threat to the national collective by targeting 
women’s bodies and disrupting Nordic tolerance towards gender equality. Consequently, the war 
narrative extends to women’s bodies who therefore must be protected. The idea that it is paramount to 
“protect our wives, girlfriends and children” against migrants’ threat is repeated like a mantra by almost 
all SOO members, or their supporters, who have been interviewed in local media outlets. Ilkka, 33 years 
old, states for instance: “These refugees do not respect our women (…). I have four daughters, and they 
used to be safe in Finland. We need to do something about it” (Faiola, 2016). Migrants are presented like 
sexual predators preying on Finnish women and girls, and in this situation the SOO see themselves as 
the last bulwark against the Barbarians. This type of narrative has been particularly strong since the knife 
attack perpetrated in Turku in August 2017 by a Moroccan asylum seeker, during which two women 
were killed and eight people injured (six women, two men), and where women were apparently purposely 
targeted: 
Nothing like this was supposed to happen in Finland. Shame on the politicians! The Minister of 
Interior, the Chief of Police, the Prime Minister and other people responsible for security in Finland 
had reassured us, about how safe Finland is, that every asylum seeker is known, that we can expect 
16 
 
no terrorist attacks in Finland… Does anyone remember those reassurances? (Support Soldiers of 
Odin Ry Tampere, 2017b).  
As it has been shown elsewhere, gender equality – even when it is not fully applied in practice – is a core 
element of nationalist discourses in Nordic countries. This notion allows radical right wing parties to 
present themselves as defending progress and modernity against regression and archaism, which migrants 
are supposed to epitomize: “Such discourses promote visions of equal, emancipated and tolerant Nordic 
citizens through a contrast to ‘bad patriarchies’ located in distant places and migrant bodies” (Keskinen, 
2013: 226).  
One of the paradoxes that these protectionist discourses reveal is the ideational proximity between 
feminist articulations of women’s security and populist sentiments concerning protection. Although 
countermedia websites operated by populist groups in Finland are highly critical of feminism, gender 
studies and female politicians (Ylä-Anttila, 2018), the SOO adopt a certain instrumental use of feminist 
imaginations of freedom to support their protectionist practices. For example, in an interview on the 
national TV channel Yle, two supporters have argued that street patrols can ensure that streets stay safe 
for women, and quote Minna Canth (1844-1897), a Finnish writer known for her feminist writings and 
positions:  
Street patrols protect something irreplaceable for Finnish woman. Minna Canth’s dream was that 
women could walk alone in peace (Yle Uutiset, 2016). 
 
Critique of Soldiers of Odin as a feminine voice 
Reactions among the Finnish population to SOO street patrols have been mixed. Several online surveys 
suggest that street patrols have had some public support, especially amongst youth. For example, in an 
online survey conducted by the Finnish magazine Suomen Kuvalehti in January 2016, after the New 
Year’s Eve incidents in Köln and Helsinki, 28% of respondents thought that patrolling was a positive 
thing and 18% were no more negative than positive (Lindholm, 2016). Other reports indicated that many 
residents think the local police does not have the resources to deal with the additional workload that the 
arrival of refugees is assumed to trigger, and many were also worried about the fact that the great majority 
of migrants are young males. In addition, emotional reactions of insecurity, fear and anxiety were 
regularly themed in interviews with women and mothers. For instance, a female local resident said: “I 
am afraid of letting my kids come here alone. Specifically due to the amount of refugees who are now 
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coming here” (Aula, 2015). Another Finnish woman, a social worker, was quoted saying: “As the mother 
of a teenage daughter I am occasionally worried. (…) Immigrants are a little scary. Scary because we 
do not know them” (Koponen, 2016). We found that journalists interviewed young women with an 
expectation that they speak about emotions and feelings of insecurity. For example, the following short 
dialogue from a documentary shot by YLE (Finland’s national public broadcasting company) exposes 
how the gendered logic of protection is sustained through affect: 
[Journalist to a young Finnish woman in the street]: How do you feel about a street patrol being here 
and guarding people’s safety? 
[Young woman]: But isn’t that a good thing? 
[Journalist]: Do you feel unsafe here in Joensuu? 
[Young woman]: I personally don’t. Some friends of mine have felt unsafe but I don’t. 
[Journalist]: Have they felt unsafe because of immigrants? 
[Young woman]: Yes (Yle Areena, 2016). 
 
Despite the SOO attempts to portray themselves as legitimate security actors, many residents, 
especially women, complain that street patrols have actually increased their feeling of insecurity. These 
narratives appear to reflect a different perspective of ordinary Finns. In a media coverage on street patrols, 
one person observed that: “The basic idea of street patrols should be to prevent unrest, but actually they 
are the ones who are causing it” and another added that she is “more afraid of street patrols than of 
foreigners” (Koponen, 2016). It is noteworthy that very few media reports about this aspect of the 
migration crisis have actually incorporated interviews with asylum seekers or refugees, and even less 
with migrant women within reception centers. Given that migrant women are particularly vulnerable to 
sexual and gender based violence, this silence operates as part of a larger matrix in which immigrants are 
denied active citizenship and participation in the public space.  
Contrary to the slow reaction of state institutions, feminists in Finland were among the first to 
respond to anti-migration vigilantism. This form of public resistance was similar to public protests 
against militarism in other regions, as it sought to challenge the belief that “men are natural protectors 
and that women should be grateful for their protection” (Enloe, 2016: 11). The main counter narrative 
which criticizes SOO street patrols has been found in the publications and actions of local feminist groups 
who identify and seek to politicize the gendered aspect of SOO. These groups, the Loldiers of Odin and 
the Kyllikin Siskot (Sisters of Kyllikki, named after a character in the Finnish national epic Kalevala), 
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attempt to resist and counter the militarized performance of street patrols by adopting a public peaceful 
counter-performance that is characterized by derision and good humor. The Loldiers of Odin, dressed as 
clowns, have ridiculed SOO patrols by dancing, singing and playing around them while they patrol 
(Pehkonen, 2016). Dismissed as “anarchist clowns” by the concerned SOO (CBC News, 2016), the 
Loldiers of Odin mock both the idea that migration has triggered greater street insecurity and the practice 
of street patrolling as a patriotic civilian response. An example for the parodic and ironic portrayal of the 
SOO was found on their website in a post describing their evening patrol: “We brought safety to the 
night by collecting banana skins from the streets, so that no human, dog or clown would slip on them” 
(Loldiers of Odin, 2016). The protests of the Loldiers of Odin indicate that other social actors are engaged 
in counter-interpretation of the street as a public space of action. Furthermore, the adoption of the non-
gendered clown performance could be read as a queer form of vigilantism that attempts to contest and 
ridicule the binary image of Finnish women as passive victims that need protection. By disrupting the 
logic of militarized protection these actions may also open space for other interpretations of women's 




In this case study we follow the emergence of a populist anti-immigration movement in Finland, the 
Soldiers of Odin, through a close reading of self-representations and media coverage since 2015. We 
focus on a particular aspect of this group’s initial mobilization phase which we identify as ‘gendered 
vigilantism’. We argue that gendered vigilantism, e.g. the formation of masculine civilian street patrols 
that are meant to protect local women from public forms of gender-based violence (street harassment and 
rape) by migrants, may provoke a feminist security dilemma. We show that through gendered 
vigilantism, the SOO were involved in a securitization effort of public forms of gender-based violence 
in a way that reinforces racial stereotypes of foreign men as aggressive predators and local women as 
passive victims. This framing is different from previous feminist engagements with the problem of 
women’s safety in public spaces, because it involves a selective and racialized understanding of gender 
and protection. As we show in this case study, securitization of sexual harassment might be understood 




Furthermore, this study suggests that the practice of street patrolling which was aimed to protect 
Finnish women from public gender-based violence, is a performance of demarcation. It attempts to 
physically mark the symbolic or ‘imagined’ boundary between a ‘native’ (woman) and a non-native 
masculinized ‘Other’ (Vieten, 2016). Through street patrols, the SOO seek to insert themselves both into 
spatial practice and into representational spaces as a particular type of militarized men: while migrant’s 
male bodies are portrayed as dangerous, violent and disruptive, Finnish male bodies are constructed as 
strong, trustworthy, protective and healthy. More generally, this practice directs attention to the 
connection between the spatial and representational dimensions of national populist social movements 
and to the way gendered vigilantism is used both as a mobilizing strategy and as a performance of white 
masculinity as good citizenship. Contrary to previous groups, such as the neo-Nazi skinhead movement 
which was mainly involved in violent activities and hate crimes, the SOO stress their protective ethos 
and practices. As such, they engage in what Vieten (2016) identifies as “normalizing culturalist gendered 
discourses” which link sexist and racist features with moral panic debates and other security concerns. 
Another finding suggests that the SOO is a movement that seeks to mobilize supporters by 
exhibiting a mixture of “traditional” and new features of nationalist politics. The references to Nordic 
mythology, the organization of street patrols and the heavy usage of gendered imaginations to describe 
infiltration and protection—all echo historic configurations of national imagery in which whiteness, 
masculinity and militarization are intertwined. The use of Nordic references serves to set the opposition 
between indigenous and newcomers at an ahistorical or even mythical level, veiling the humanitarian 
crisis which caused the refugees’ arrival. Simultaneously, these historic configurations are invoked as a 
response to challenges that are constantly framed as “new”: the weakening of the state due to privatization 
and EU integration, and the existence of a culture clash (or, religious war) between 
indigeneity/Christianity and Islam.  
The analysis of public sources reveals four recurring themes that are used by SOO members to 
portray themselves as part of a legitimate social movement: protective masculinity, militarized 
masculinity, supplement of the state, and indigenous masculinity. These themes could be understood to 
reflect two sets of justifications that might apply to other fraternal organizations. The first relates to the 
neo-liberal logic of civil society which stresses individual entrepreneurship, responsibility, agency and 
social involvement as a supplement to privatization and the diminishing power of the state. The second 
calls attention to the representations of women as passive victims and thus, to the re-emergence of racial 
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or ethnic discourses that see civilian forms of masculinist protection as a legitimate response to everyday 
conflict on ‘the street’. 
This study suggests that both sets of justifications reflect a tension between embodied local 
practices of citizenship and abstract narratives about EU integration. Militarized patrols which occur in 
a particular place – the street – are meant to reaffirm the existence of national borders and the importance 
of white masculinities for defending them. Further research is needed to better understand the links 
between state security actors and non-state organizations like SOO; transnational patterns of proliferation 
of such groups, and in particular the importance of white masculinist ideologies in the diffusion of 
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